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The Unconstitutionality of the East Ramapo School District’s Theocracy 
The East Ramapo school district is located in a residential suburban area of Rockland 
County, approximately 40 miles northwest of Manhattan.1 As of November 2014, there were 
33,000 school age children in the district, of which 9,000 attended public schools while 24,000 
attended private Jewish day schools.2  The East Ramapo school Board is controlled primarily by 
Orthodox Jewish men who send their children to private schools.3 Most public-school families are 
poor minorities, who have complained for years that the Hasidic-controlled education board has 
cut programs for public school students while Jewish children who study privately are unharmed 
by budget cuts.4 The Board appears to favor the interests of religious private schools over public 
schools as evidenced by the handling of the district’s budget crisis and allocation of state funds. 5  
While under Orthodox control, the spending for private schools increased while the board 
undertook spending cuts to public school programs in addition to eliminating employment 
positions and implementing purchasing freezes to balance the budget.6  Specifically, transportation 
costs increased overall by 48.1%, more than double the 21.9% statewide increase, while spending 
on private school transportation rose by 76.6%, more than triple the statewide average.7 Moreover, 
the district spends $60 million for special education costs to serve 2,423 students, with private 
school students receiving state funded special education services in upwards of 40 yeshivot, the 
                              
1 Freeman Klopott, Hasidic Townhouse Foes Seek to Dissolve Catskills Village, BloombergBusiness, Sept. 24, 
2014, http://www.blomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-24/hasidic-townhouse-foes-seek-to-dissolve-catskills-
village. 
2 New York State Education Dept., Report of Investigation-East Ramapo: A School District in Crisis, at 6 (2014). 
3 Leslie Brody, Former NYC Schools Chancellor Dennis Walcott to Serve as East Ramapo Monitor, The Wall Street 
Journal, Aug. 13, 2015, at 2. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Report of Investigation, supra note 2, at 30-32. 
7 Id. at 15.  
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Kiryas Joel union free school district and out of district private schools.8 Additionally, the district’s 
legal fees rose by 668%, including payouts of over $9 million dollars to 14 law firms to defend 
against litigation.9  The Board also regularly conducts meetings in executive session, about 60-
70% or more, to limit opportunity for public participation at Board meetings.10 Lastly, the Board 
closed an underperforming school and subsequently sold it to an ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
congregation for $4.9 million, allegedly millions of dollars less than its fair market value. 11 To 
rectify the situation, State Education Commissioner Mary Ellen Elia appointed Former NYC 
School Chancellor Dennis Walcott to serve as East Ramapo’s Monitor and to head a three-member 
team that would oversee the school board’s conduct.12   
The Problem with the East Ramapo School Board 
Orthodox Judaism is the branch of Judaism that strictly adheres to traditional Jewish 
practices and beliefs, such as keeping kosher, Sabbath observance, traditional prayer, Torah study 
and gender segregation. To avoid mingling with gentiles, Orthodox Jews believe in complete 
segregation between themselves and non-Jews in all social situations, including educational 
environments. The East Ramapo School board is comprised entirely of Orthodox Jewish men who 
send their children to private Jewish day schools. Most of the 9,000 public-school children who 
live in the East Ramapo school district are poor minority students, whose parents have complained 
for years that the Orthodox-controlled school board has cut programs for public school students 
while the 24,000 Jewish children who attend private schools are unharmed by these budget cuts. 
                              
8 Id. at 17 
9 See Id.; Report of Investigation, supra note 2, at 27. 
10 Id. at 34-35 
11 Mareesa Nicosia, E. Ramapo Parents Challenge 2nd Hillcest Sale, Lohud, Jan. 15, 2015, 
http://www.lohud.com/story/news/education/2015/01/14/East-Ramapo-parents-challenge-second-hillcrest-sale-
yeshiva/2175405 
12 See Id.; Former NYC Schools Chancellor Dennis Walcott to Serve as East Ramapo Monitor, at 1-2. 
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Based on the Board’s conduct, the East Ramapo School Board has established a de facto theocracy 
as it favors the interests of and makes decisions that benefit Jewish private schools, and the 
Orthodox community in particular, over public schools as evidenced by the handling of the 
district’s budget crisis, allocation of state funds and the intentional exclusion of the parents of 
public school children from the decision-making process. Instead of the New York State Education 
Department implementing “The Lakewood Model”, wherein the state-appointed monitor has veto 
power over the Board’s and Superintendent’s decisions, can attend all board meetings, including 
closed sessions, and oversee strategic planning, the Education Department decided to appoint a 
Monitor without such authority.13 Since the Monitor’s real power is nonexistent in that it lacks 
veto power and cannot reverse board decisions, fire board members or attend closed executive 
board sessions, the Monitor will not be able to rectify the underlying problem of the Board’s 
theocratic tendencies.14  
The issues in this case are: 1) Whether it violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment for state funds for special education purposes to be given to Jewish private schools; 
2) Whether the Board’s conduct, favoring Jewish private schools and the Orthodox community in 
the allocation of those funds is a violation of the Establishment Clause; and 3) Whether a 
reasonable observer would view the Board’s decisions as sending a message of endorsement of 
the Jewish religion.   This essay argues and concludes that as to the first issue, there is no 
Establishment Clause violation for a school board controlled by Orthodox Jews, whose children 
attend private schools, to allocate special education funds to private religious schools. With respect 
to the second and third issues, however, this essay argues and concludes that the Establishment 
                              
13 Amy Sara Clark, Answer to East Ramapo School Oversight in Lakewood?, The Jewish Week, Dec. 12, 2014, 
http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/new-york/answer-east-ramapo-school-oversight-lakewood. 
14 See Id.; Former NYC Schools Chancellor Dennis Walcott to Serve as East Ramapo Monitor, at 4. 
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Clause is violated. The Board’s conduct, consisting of eliminating public school programs and 
resources while simultaneously providing more state funds to Yeshivot, favors Jewish private 
schools and the Orthodox community, violates the Establishment Clause. Any reasonable observer 
viewing the Board’s decisions to intentionally exclude the parents of public school children from 
the decision-making process, and the closing of public schools and selling the building below 
market value to a synagogue for the purpose of opening a Jewish private school, would view these 
actions as sending a message of endorsement of the Jewish religion, in flagrant violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Religious Control of Government 
Theocratic control of a governmental entity, such as the East Ramapo school district in this 
case, obviously implicates the First Amendment. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of 
the Constitution, made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, safeguards the right 
to freedom of religion and expression from government intrusion.15 The Free Exercise Clause 
prevents the government from “regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such.”16 
The Establishment Clause, which dictates that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion”, enforces the "separation of church and state" in addition to ensuring 
religious freedom.17  Although the authors of the Religion Clauses regarded the establishment of 
religion as significant and “fraught with great dangers”, the language of the clauses are unclear, 
making it difficult to recognize when the Clause has been violated.18  The Establishment Clause 
was designed to avoid state “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
                              
15 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
16 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398402 (1963). 
17 Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment 
18 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) 
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sovereign in religious activity.”19 Thus, our analysis commences with the cumulative development 
of the law.  
The fact that Orthodox Jews control the Board of Education, in and of itself, does not 
constitute an Establishment Clause violation. In fact, in McDaniel v. Paty, the Court upheld the 
right of religious citizens to seek public office.20 In that case, the Court reviewed a Tennessee 
statutory provision disqualifying “ministers of the Gospel or priests of any denomination…” from 
seeking public office.21  In striking down the Tennessee statute, the Court held that it violated the 
candidate’s First Amendment rights as it conditioned his right to the free exercise of his religion 
on the surrender of this right to seek public office. 22 The Court reasoned that the government may 
not use religion as a basis for imposing benefits or penalties. 23 Further, government may not bar 
from political participation individuals, such as ministers, whom it deems as overly involved in 
religion. 24 
The challenged statute in McDaniel, although held unconstitutional, reflected a concern 
about religious control over governmental entities, which would clearly violate the Establishment 
Clause. Courts employ three tests to make such inquiries. The first is the Lemon test. In Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, a Pennsylvania statute that reimbursed religious schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, 
and other instructional materials and a Rhode Island statue that allowed the state to pay private 
school teachers a 15% salary supplement were found unconstitutional under the Establishment 
Clause.25 The Court found that despite promoting a secular legislative purpose, the statutes 
                              
19 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) 
20 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 619 (1978). 
21 Id. at 618.   
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 619. 
24 McDanial, 436 U.S. at 641. 
25 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 641-42. 
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involved excessive entanglement between church and state.26 In arriving at its decision, the Court, 
coined the three-prong Lemon test, which looked at the statute’s secular legislative purpose, 
whether the statute advanced or inhibited religion as its primary effect, and whether the statue 
excessively entangled government with religion. 27 The Lemon Test has subsequently been 
modified by Agostini v. Felton, which will be discussed below.28 
The second test, the Endorsement test, was set out in Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly. Lynch involved an action brought against the government for 
including a nativity scene in its Christmas display.29 The Court found that, notwithstanding the 
religious significance of the nativity scene, the city’s display did not violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.30 The Court reasoned that the inclusion of the display was not an 
advancement or endorsement of religion since the benefits caused by its inclusion to one religion 
over another was “incidental, indirect and remote.”31 Justice O’Connor, in a separate concurring 
opinion, joined the majority; however, the Justice criticized the Court’s reliance on the Lemon test, 
proposing instead an alternative that would replace the purpose and effect prongs of the test with 
the endorsement test, which examines “whether the government intends to convey a message of 
endorsement of disapproval of religion” and whether the government’s conduct has the “effect of 
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”32 Additionally, 
Justice O’Connor went on to state that “The Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
                              
26 Id. at 603.   
27 Id. at 612-613.  
28 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997), modified, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
29 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) 
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 669. 
32 Id. at 690-691.  
Lakisha Finkelstein 
Page 7 of 25 
 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political 
community.”33 
 The third test, known as the delegation test, asks whether the governmental authority has 
been delegated to a religious entity or to a group based on religious identify or characteristics. In 
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., the Court found a Massachusetts statute unconstitutional that gave 
churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses to establishments within a 500-foot 
radius of a church.34  The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, held that by giving 
churches a ''unilateral and absolute power'' over an important governmental function, the statute 
violated the constitutionally required separation between church and state because it “enmeshes 
churches in the processes of government” and creates the danger of “[p]olitical fragmentation and 
divisiveness along religious lines.”35 
 The Court next considered the delegation issue in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel 
Village School District v. Grumet. In Grumet, the New York State legislature enacted a special 
statute that created a separate school district to provide special education services to students with 
disabilities who attended a religious school operated by the Satmar Hasidic Orthodox Jewish 
Sect.36   The challenged statute violated the three-prong Lemon test because it had a religious 
rather than a secular purpose; it was enacted to meet the religious requirements of the Satmar 
Hasidim; and it had the effect of advancing, protecting, and fostering the religious beliefs of the 
Hasidic community.37 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that the statute deviated from 
the constitutional mandate of neutrality toward religion by delegating the government’s 
                              
33 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 
34 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).  
35 Id. 
36 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
37 Id.  
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discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious 
community under circumstances that gave no assurance that governmental power would be 
exercised neutrally.38 The Court decided that the statute resulted in an impermissible fusion of 
government with religious functions, since the statute delegated power to an electorate defined by 
common religious belief and practice.39  
In addition to the three federal constitutional tests, states have similarly addressed issues 
of theocratic control of government. In State of Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, the State sought 
judgment declaring that it was not required to recognize the municipal status of a city allegedly 
controlled by a religious organization.40 In addressing the question, the Oregon District Court 
applied the Lemon test to determine whether such recognition had a secular purpose; whether its 
principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited religion and whether the statute fostered “an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.”41  The Court held that governmental conduct, 
through operation of state law, which imparts sovereign municipal status to a city completely 
controlled, inhabited and owned by a religious organization, even if elected according to state law, 
would have the primary effect of advancing religion, which violates the Establishment Clause.42  
Similarly, in State of New Jersey v. Celmer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey examined a 
statutory scheme which delegated governmental powers to make laws and enforce laws through 
municipal courts to the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist 
Church.43 The Court ruled that the statute granting the camp meeting association, a religious 
                              
38 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 687. 
39 Id. at 688.  
40 State of Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F.Supp. 1208 (1984) 
41 Id. at 1212.  
42 Id. at 1208.  
43 State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 408 (1979). 
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organization, municipal powers violated the Establishment clause.44 The state cannot cede 
governmental powers to a religious organization, transforming the religious organization into civil 
government.45 
THE SPECIAL EDUCATION FUNDING THAT IS GIVEN TO PRIVATE 
JEWISH DAY SCHOOLS IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
MODIFIED LEMON TEST 
  
 The main federal law involving the educational rights of children with disabilities is the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires states to provide a free and 
appropriate public education for all children with disabilities who attend public or private 
schools.46 This law authorizes Special Education funding that is given to private Jewish day 
schools and is constitutional under the modified Lemon test. To determine whether the funding 
violates the Establishment Clause, the government action must first have a secular purpose, and 
second not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.47 The funding 
has a principal or primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion if 1) the funding results in 
religious indoctrination and 2) it defines its recipients by reference to religion.48 The funding 
results in religious indoctrination if the allocation of the aid is not the result of the independent, 
private choice of individual parents.49 Funding defines its recipients by reference to religion when 
allocating the aid creates a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.50 A financial 
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination is present when 1) the aid is not allocated on the 
                              
44 Id. at 405. 
45 Id. at 413. 
46 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. 
47 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
48 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (modified the entitlement analysis and will be discussed infra).  
49 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002) 
50 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205. 
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basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and 2) is not made available 
to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.51  
 The law that authorizes the funding to Jewish day schools has a legitimate secular purpose. 
To determine whether the funding violates the establishment clause, the government action must 
1) have a secular purpose, and 2) not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.52  In Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, the Supreme Court held that a 
statute granting aid under a vocational rehabilitation program that provides services to a visually 
impaired student on the campus of a private Christian college served a valid secular purpose of 
“promot[ing] the well-being of the visually handicapped through the provision of vocational 
rehabilitation services.”53 Even if a minuscule amount of the state aid awarded under the program 
flows to the religious institution, this fact does not detract from the secular purpose of the statute.54 
Likewise in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dis., the Court found that providing interpretive 
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) to a student attending Catholic high 
school served the secular purpose of “assist[ing] States and Localities to provide for the education 
of all handicapped children.”55 Here, like in Zobrest and Witter, the purpose of the funding to 
Jewish Day schools is the facilitation of access to secular special education services to all 
handicapped and disabled students who would not otherwise receive such services if offered only 
in public schools in the East Ramapo School District. Thus, the funding given to Jewish day 
schools for special education services has a clear secular purpose. 
                              
51 Id.  
52 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
53 Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485–86, (1986). 
54 Id. at 486. 
55 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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Since the funding provided to Jewish day schools has the valid secular purpose of providing 
special education services to disabled and handicapped children, the next question is whether the 
law that authorizes the funding has the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.56 The funding has the principal or primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion, if 1) 
the funding results in religious indoctrination and 2) it defines its recipients by reference to 
religion.57  
To understand how the Supreme Court defines an unconstitutional effect, we must consider 
three decisions: Agostini, Mitchell & Zelman. In Agostini v. Felton, the Court held that a federally 
funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a 
neutral basis, given on the premises of religious schools by government employees, did not violate 
the Establishment Clause when such instruction contained safeguards.58  Instead of applying all 
three of Lemon’s prongs, inquiring whether the statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between 
government and religion, Agostini examined only the first and second of those factors. The Court 
modified the entanglement analysis by eliminating it as a separate prong and making it simply one 
criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect.59  The Court then identified three primary 
criteria under the statutory effects prong to determine whether governmental aid has the effect of 
advancing religion: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination, (2) whether it 
defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) whether it creates an excessive entanglement.60 
After applying the modified Lemon test, the Court found that the program did not result in religions 
                              
56 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
57 Id. at 234.  
58 Id. at 203.  
59 Id. at 232-33.  
60 Id. 
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indoctrination, did not define its recipients by reference to religion and it did not create an 
excessive entanglement.61 
Mitchell v. Helms involved an action challenging the constitutionality of a school aid 
program that provided federal funds to public and private schools to implement "secular, neutral, 
and non-ideological" programs.62 The Court held that it is not a violation of the Establishment 
Clause to earmark funds for religious schools if there is no indication that the funds will be used 
for religious purposes.63 The Court reasoned that, since the loans were suitable for both religious 
and public schools, the loans did not represent governmental indoctrination or advancement of 
religion because they were made in a nondiscriminatory manner.64 In upholding the program, the 
Court used the modified Lemon Test: whether the program has a secular purpose and whether the 
program has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.65 However, the third criterion of 
the Lemon Test was held irrelevant in evaluating aid to religious schools in Agostini.66   
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court ruled that a school voucher program which 
allowed parents to send their children to private schools did not violate the Establishment Clause, 
even though the majority of participating private schools are religiously affiliated.67 The Court 
upheld the program on the basis of the following findings: the secular purpose of the program was 
to assist poor children in a failing public school to complete their education; the program did not 
favor religion since it allowed all schools to participate irrespective of religious affiliation; the 
program did not incentivize private schools because participating private schools received half the 
                              
61 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 206. 
62 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) 
63 Id. at 796. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 807. 
66 Id. at 807-808. 
67 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
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aid of community school and only a third of that given to magnet schools, and the program 
provided ample educational opportunities for parents to select secular options for their children.68    
The Court reasoned that the program was neutral to religion, used criteria based on financial need 
and geography with respect to a particular school district, and enabled beneficiaries the true choice 
with regard to educational options available to utilize the aid.69 
Applying the effects test as outlined in Agostini, Mitchell & Zelman, the law that authorizes 
funding received by Orthodox day schools as a general matter, does not have the principal or 
primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion.  Funding has the primary effect of inhibiting or 
advancing religion if 1) the funding results in religious indoctrination and 2) it defines its recipients 
by reference to religion.70 The fact that funding is given to Orthodox day schools in this case does 
not result in religious indoctrination. The funding results in religious indoctrination if 1) the 
allocation of the aid is not the result of the independent, private choice of individual parents.71 In 
Zelman, the program gave parents a choice as to where and in what manner to educate their 
children.72 The law that sets out the special education funding does not limit allocation to religious 
schools. A child receives special education services regardless of the school chosen, so no 
incentive is created to send children to private yeshivas. Thus, the funding does not result in 
religious indoctrination. 
Now that it has been established that funding does not result in religious indoctrination, the 
next question is whether the funding given to Jewish day schools defines its recipients by reference 
to religion. The law that authorizes the funding given to Orthodox day schools does not define its 
                              
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
71 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 640. 
72 Id. at 645-48.  
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recipients by reference to religion. Funding defines its recipients by reference to religion when 1) 
allocating the aid creates a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.73 A financial 
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination is present when the aid is not allocated on the basis 
of neutral, secular criteria that neither favors nor disfavors religion, and 2) is not made available 
to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.74  
The special education funding law does not define its recipients by reference to religion in 
this case. In Agostini, the recipients of the funding under New York City's Title I program did not 
receive any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or practices to obtain program services.75 
Like in Agostini, the receipt of funding in this case is not based on whether or not Orthodox Jews 
modify their religious beliefs or practices. The funds are available to any and all students who 
qualify for special education services under the IDEA. In concurrence, Justice Powell made clear 
that “state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined 
without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because 
any aid to religion results from the private decisions of beneficiaries.” 76 Therefore, the aid is 
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criterial that neither favor nor disfavors religion. 
Turning to the next inquiry, one asks whether the funds are made available to both religious 
and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. The funds are made available to both 
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. In Agostini, New York City's Title 
I services are available to all children who meet the eligibility requirements, regardless of religious 
belief or affiliation and no matter where the children attend school.77 Similarly, in Mitchell, under 
                              
73 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-399 (1983) 
77 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205. 
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the state statue, the aid was allocated based on enrollment to both private and public schools.78 
Like in Agostini and Mitchell, the funds allocated to Orthodox day schools are to provide special 
education services to those children who qualify under IDEA, regardless of religious affiliation.  
 One could argue that the Establishment Clause necessitates that aid to religious schools not 
be used for religious purposes. But this argument fails because, provided the state funding is not 
“unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content” and eligibility for state 
funding is assessed in a constitutionally permissible fashion, the use of the funding to indoctrinate 
religiously cannot be attributed to the government.79 Further, the more “attenuated [the] financial 
benefit ... that eventually flows to parochial schools,” the more Courts are willing to find state 
funding permissible.80 Additionally, the manner in which the funding is used does not affect the 
criteria governing the aid's allocation and thus does not establish any impermissible incentive 
under Agostini 's second prong.81 Therefore, there is no financial incentive to undertake religious 
indoctrination in order for Orthodox day schools to obtain state funding.   
Accordingly, the special education funding is distributed based on the true private choice 
of parents, and thus constitutional. It is neutral in all respects toward religion, and is part the 
district’s general and multifaceted undertaking to provide special education and related services to 
children eligible for services under the IDEA. Special educational funding is directly available to 
a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion and allows participation of all 
district schools whether religious or nonreligious. 
 
 
                              
78 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 796. 
79 Id. at 820. 
80 Mueller, 463 U.S., at 400. 
81 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820.  
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THE CONDUCT OF BOARD OF EDUCATION IN EAST RAMAPO IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE LEMON TEST 
 
 In contrast to the constitutionality of the school aid that flows to yeshivas, the East 
Ramapo Board of Education’s conduct violates the Establishment Clause.  In order to determine 
whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause, the government action must 1) have a 
secular purpose, 2) not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and 
3) not foster an excessive entanglement between government and religion.82 There is government 
entanglement if 1) the conduct fosters excessive administrative entanglement between government 
and religion or 2) has the potential for “Political Entanglement”, which divides an electorate or 
legislature along religious lines. To determine whether the government entanglement with religion 
is excessive, one must examine 1) the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, 
2) the nature of the aid that the State provides, and 3) the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.  
 The conduct of the East Ramapo school board does not have a legitimate secular purpose. 
To determine whether the Board’s conduct violates the establishment clause, the government 
action must 1) have a secular purpose, and 2) does not the principal or primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion. In McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky, the Supreme Court ruled that the posting of the Ten Commandments in courthouses did 
not serve a valid secular purpose. 83 In finding that the secular purpose of posting the Ten 
Commandments was a sham, the Court concluded that the county’s actual purpose was to 
emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious message. 84  According to the Lemon test, 
                              
82 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218. 
83 McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) 
84 Id. at 846. 
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governmental conduct requires a secular purpose; however, “the secular purpose required has to 
be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” 85 The case at bar is 
similar McCreary in that the Board’s conduct is based solely on a desire to surreptitiously funnel 
tax-payer money into Jewish day schools for the benefit of Orthodox children, without regard for 
the effect on public schools and public school children.  Thus, the board’s conduct clearly has no 
secular purpose. 
 Using the unconstitutional effects test defined by Agostini, Mitchell & Zelman, the 
conduct does have the principal or primary effect of advancing religion. Conduct has a principal 
or primary effect or primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion if 1) the conduct results in 
religious indoctrination and 2) it defines its recipients by reference to religion.86 
 The Board’s conduct does result in religious indoctrination. Conduct results in religious 
indoctrination if the allocation of the aid is not the result of the independent, private choice of 
individual parents.87 In Zelman, the program gave parents a choice as to where and in what manner 
to educate their children.88 This case is dissimilar in that Orthodox parents do not have a true 
private choice in where to send their children. In order for funding to reach private Jewish day 
schools, the Board of Education must approve the placement of special education children. The 
parents do not have a choice in where to enroll their children, as the decision is at the discretion of 
the Board of Education.89 One could argue that Orthodox Jewish parents could find a private school 
and request approval for placement from the Board of Education and, if approved, the decision to 
                              
85 Id. at 864 
86 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
87 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 640. 
88 Id. at 645-48. 
89 Gary Stern & Mareesa Nicosia, East Ramapo: A district in Crisis, Lohud, Sept. 9, 2012, 
http://www.lohud.com/story/news/education/2014/09/17/east-ramapo-district-
crisis/15775703/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin=. 
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allocate funds would be the independent, private choice of individual parents.  However, this 
argument fails because ultimately, whether or not the child attends the program is determined by 
the Board of Education and not the parents. Therefore, the Board’s conduct does result in religious 
indoctrination. 
 Now that it has been established that the Board’s conduct results in religious 
indoctrination, one turns to whether the Board’s conduct defines its recipients by reference to 
religion. Conduct defines its recipients by reference to religion when allocating aid creates a 
financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.90 A financial incentive to undertake 
religious indoctrination is present when 1) the aid is not allocated on the basis of neutral, secular 
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and 2) is not made available to both religious and 
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.91 In Agostini, the recipients of the funding 
under New York City's Title I program did not receive any incentive to modify their religious 
beliefs or practices to obtain program services.92 Here, since the state has not taken or acted upon 
the complaints of non-Orthodox Jews and non-Jewish parents who send their children to public 
school, these parents may either become Orthodox Jews and/or convert to Orthodox Judaism in 
order to send their children to Jewish day schools to receive adequate services for their children.93 
One could argue that the Board’s conduct has only a remote and incidental effect on the 
advancement of religion. However, this is an unsuccessful argument in that the government has 
conferred upon the Orthodox controlled school board the authority to determine who will receive 
services and where those services will be administered. The power conferred upon the school board 
                              
90 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 This is common knowledge within the Orthodox community. See, e.g., R (on the application of E) v Governing 
Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (U.K.). 
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may be used by the Orthodox to employ overtly religious objectives, which would favor members 
of the Jewish faith.94 There is no “effective means of guaranteeing” that the Board’s power “will 
be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and non-ideological purposes.”95 One could also claim 
that parents aren’t required to modify their beliefs in order to gain services. However, this 
argument fails because, despite years of complaints about the diminishing services to public school 
children and the appointment of a monitor without veto power over the board, the board continues 
to make budget cuts and allocate funds in a manner beneficial to yeshivot. Obviously, the 
allocation of state aid creates a financial incentive for non-Orthodox Jews and non-Jews to 
undertake religious indoctrination. 
 The next inquiry asks whether the funds are made available to both religious and secular 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. The funds are not made available to both religious and 
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. In Agostini, New York City's Title I services 
are available to all children who meet the eligibility requirements, regardless of religious belief or 
affiliation and no matter where the children attend school.96 Similarly, in Mitchell, under the state 
statue, the aid was allocated based on enrollment to both private and public schools.97 In this case, 
these funds are only going to benefit a certain type of student, the Orthodox, in a biased way. The 
Board approves special education placement for eligible children in yeshivot, despite, the fact that 
the district could provide services inexpensively in a public school setting. Further, the Board 
eliminated special education positions that would benefit all special education children whether 
receiving these services in a private or public school setting.  Yet, despite the fact that services are 
                              
94 See Klopott, supra note 1, at 3. 
95 Mitchell, 530 U.S at 793   
96 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205. 
97 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793. 
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available to all children who meet eligibility requirements under the IDEA, the only children 
benefiting are Orthodox Jewish children since only the Orthodox are allowed to enroll in Jewish 
day schools.98 One could argue that the funds are being distributed based on the neutral, secular 
criteria of the IDEA. But this is not persuasive because the Board is making decisions in a manner 
that would prevent non-Orthodox children from obtaining services under the IDEA while ensuring 
that Orthodox children, the only children permitted to attend Jewish day schools, receive more 
services. Since the Jewish day schools are receiving most of the money while students attending 
public schools are receiving fewer services, it is obvious that the funds are not made available to 
both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Hence, the Board’s conduct 
has the principal or primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion. 
Having established that the Board’s conduct has the principal or primary effect of 
enhancing or inhibiting religion, the inquiry now focuses on whether there is entanglement 
between the government and the Jewish religion. There is government entanglement if 1) the 
conduct fosters excessive administrative entanglement between government and religion or 2) has 
the potential for “Political Entanglement”, which divides an electorate or legislature along 
religious lines.99 To determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, 
we must examine 1) the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, 2) the nature 
of the aid that the State provides, and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the 
religious authority.100 In Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., the Court invalidated a statute that 
delegated to churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses to establishments within 
                              
98 This is common knowledge within the Orthodox community. See R (on the application of E) v Governing Body 
of JFS and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.)., supra note 93.  
99 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. 
100 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. 
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a 500-foot radius of a church.101 The Court held that by giving churches a ''unilateral and absolute 
power'' over an important governmental function, the statute violated the constitutionally-required 
separation between church and state as it “enmeshes churches in the processes of government” and 
creates the danger of “[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines.”102 Similar 
to the church in Larkin, the Orthodox-controlled school board has absolute power and discretion 
in making budget cuts, allocating state funds and other important governmental functions.103 
Jewish day schools exist for the primary purpose of promoting the Jewish religious teachings and 
traditions to ensure Jewish children remain strict adherents to the Jewish faith. The Board of 
Education supplies these schools with funds in order to provide services under the IDEA for 
eligible children who qualify for services. Notwithstanding the district’s budgetary problems, the 
Orthodox-controlled Board approves placement for Orthodox students in yeshivot when there are 
inexpensive alternatives in district.104 Further, closing schools and subsequently selling public 
property at a significant discount to religious authorities in the Orthodox community to open 
Jewish day schools is indicative of a close relationship between the government and religious 
authorities.105 The mere fact that the Board is Orthodox is irrelevant; however, the fact that the 
Orthodox-controlled Board is utilizing its political authority to act in a manner beneficial to the 
Orthodox Community, suggests the Board has established a theocratic government. 
 Now that it has been established that the Board’s conduct fosters excessive entanglement, 
one may inquire whether the Board’s conduct has the potential for “Political Entanglement”, which 
                              
101 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 116. 
102 Id. 
103 See Klopott, supra note 1, at 26-33. 
104 See Report of Investigation, supra note 2, at 18. 
105 Uriel Heilman, In Rockland County, non-Orthodox try to create alternative to Hasidic dominance, Jewish 
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divides an electorate or legislature along religious lines. Public schools in East Ramapo, where no 
Orthodox Jews are enrolled, continue to have services eliminated while Jewish day schools 
increasing receive the majority of the education funding. This, coupled with the fact that the Board 
regularly holds closed door meetings at late hours to prevent the parents of public school children 
from participating in public board meetings and that their complaints are constantly overlooked, 
has led to mistrust of the Orthodox Jews in East Ramapo.106 Parents are of the impression that the 
Orthodox Jews only care for themselves and the needs of their children, which has resulted in 
contentious interactions between the Orthodox and non-adherents of the Jewish faith. 
Thus, the Board’s conduct not only fosters excessive administrative entanglement between 
government and religion, but has the potential for political divisiveness. This, combined with the 
Board’s improper religious purposes for making its decisions and the impermissible principal or 
primary effect of those decisions, implicates a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.    
 
THE BOARD’S DECISIONS HAVE THE EFFECT OF SENDING THE 
MESSAGE OF ENDORSEMENT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION TO A 
REASONABLE OBSERVER 
  
 Now that we have concluded that the East Ramapo School Board’s conduct is 
unconstitutional under the Lemon test, one now turns to whether the Board’s conduct is also 
unconstitutional under the Endorsement test, in that it endorses a particular religion, in this case, 
Judaism. To determine whether the government endorses a particular religion, one must show that 
1) the board’s decisions intended to or have the effect of sending a message of endorsement of a 
particular religion to a reasonable observer.107  In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court held that the 
                              
106 See Report of Investigation, supra note 2, at 35. 
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inclusion of a crèche in a holiday display was not an advancement or endorsement of religion.108 
In concurrence, Justice O’Connor, utilizing the endorsement test, found that the purpose of 
including the crèche in the display was not to promote religion but rather to celebrate a public 
holiday through traditional symbolism.109 Further, the Justice concluded that the crèche did not 
have the effect of communicating a message of the government’s endorsement of Christianity 
because, despite the religious and sectarian significance of the crèche, a reasonable observer would 
not associate a display celebrating a public holiday with very strong secular components and 
traditions to be an endorsement of the Christian religion and faith.110 Endorsement conveys a 
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders and not full members of the political community, 
while the message to adherents is the exact opposite, one of favoritism.111  
 Any reasonable observer scrutinizing the Board’s decisions would conclude that the 
decisions are made to benefit Jewish day schools and the Orthodox community in particular.112 
Those decisions involve a clear message, whether intended or inadvertent, that one’s adherence to 
Judaism is relevant to citizenship and the benefits of citizenship. First, The Board decided to close 
public schools and sell state-owned buildings below market value to Jewish organizations to open 
Jewish day schools. Second, the Board regularly cut the school budget; however, despite budgetary 
cuts, Jewish day schools increasingly receive the majority of the education funding in East 
Ramapo, while public schools, where no Orthodox Jews are in attendance, continue to have 
services eliminated. Third, the Board holds regular closed door meetings at late hours to prevent 
the parents of public school children from participating in public board meetings. Fourth, because 
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public school parents are consistently prevented from participating in the public meetings and their 
complaints are constantly overlooked, the Board is conveying a message to parents that they are 
not full members of the political community and that the Orthodox Jews control the political 
process. Therefore, the Board’s decisions do have the effect of communicating a message of 
governmental endorsement of Judaism, which clearly violates the Establishment Clause.  
 Even though no statute or state law has formally delegated power to a religious body, as 
in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, or along religious lines as in Kiryas Joel, the East Ramapo School 
Board functions as a religious body that possesses civic power, an unmistakable violation of the 
most basic division of governmental and religious functions. 
Conclusion 
Although the Special Education funding received by Jewish day schools is constitutional, 
the board’s conduct and decisions violate the Establishment Clause. The Special Education 
funding that is given to private Jewish day schools is constitutional under the modified Lemon 
Test. First, the funding to Jewish day schools has a legitimate secular purpose. Second, the funding 
does not have the principal or primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion. Third, the funding 
does not result in religious indoctrination. Fourth, the funding does not define its recipients by 
reference to religion. And, lastly, there is no financial incentive to undertake religious 
indoctrination.  
However, the conduct of the Board of Education in East Ramapo is unconstitutional under 
the Lemon Test since the conduct of the East Ramapo school board does not have a legitimate 
secular purpose. First, the conduct does have the principal or primary effect of enhancing religion. 
Second, the conduct does result in religious indoctrination. Third, the conduct does define its 
recipients by reference to religion. Fourth, there is a financial incentive to undertake religious 
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indoctrination in this case. Fifth, there is entanglement between the government and Judaism. 
Finally, there is excessive governmental entanglement between the Orthodox-controlled school 
board and the Jewish religion.  
Lastly, the Board’s decisions have the effect of sending a reasonable observer the message 
that it endorses a particular religion. Likewise, the Board’s decisions have the effect of sending 
the message that the government endorses Judaism to a reasonable observer.  
In light of the above, the only way to ensure that the East Ramapo School Board operates 
constitutionally is for the New York State Education Department to adopt the successful 
“Lakewood Model” and expand the Monitor’s authority similar to that of the Lakewood Monitor. 
By granting Mr. Walcott real authority, he, like the Monitor in Lakewood, could successfully 
thwart Establishment Clause violations and quash any semblance of an East Ramapo Theocracy. 
 
 
